The only way out is through
A look at the Transitional Justice Policy
Hi there,
Monday marked the third day of national mourning to commemorate the lives lost in the mudslides in the South Ethiopia region. I have compiled one update on that which includes what the rescue efforts looked like, what the toll of the tragedy has been, and where people can send monetary support for the community impacted.
My update from last week’s edition featured a statement by an international organization, the International Federation for Human Rights, which had framed the closure of over 1,500 Civil Society Organizations due to administrative reasons as, ‘systematic closures’. People in the civil society space have since reached out to share that despite other menacing signs that indicate an encroachment on the work of CSOs, these closures were mostly due to the dormancy of the CSOs in question.
In this week’s edition is a deeper dive into the Transitional Justice Policy; the what, where, who, when, and why.
Though not included in the updates, it’s worth looking at this story on the Eritrean government’s decision to ban all Ethiopian Airlines flights into the country, which caused quite a patriotic flurry on social media.
To new subscribers, welcome!
My name is Maya Misikir, and I’m a freelance reporter based in Addis Abeba. I write Sifter, this newsletter where I send out the week’s top 5 stories on human rights and news in Ethiopia.
Now, to the news.
Human rights: ‘From Policy to Practice’
I have written updates on the Transitional Justice Policy in the past editions of Sifter; most notably, when public consultations for it were finalized, when the Ministry of Justice announced that its team had finished drafting the Policy, and when the Policy was approved by the Council of Ministers earlier in April.
The Ministry of Justice is currently working out a roadmap for the implementation of this Policy.
As pointed out in the annual human rights report by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, the implementation of this Policy will be very important in the coming years.
Below are highlights from a policy brief that goes into the details of this Policy and argues that despite the flaws in its formulation process, it can be, ‘retrospectively legitimised’ through an implementation process that follows international standards.
First and foremost, this Transitional Justice Policy is not a result of the peace deal that ended the Tigray war, says the brief. It’s important to know that it was set in motion before it.
The Transitional Justice Policy is meant to deal with the injustices of the country’s past.
But how far back are we talking? For criminal accountability, the Policy will cover, ‘injustices that have occurred since 1995’.
Why 1995? Ethiopia had a post-1991 transitional justice (for the crimes committed during the communist Dergue regime). The four-year gap during which there was a transitional government is not addressed.
Accountability for what kind of crimes? Civil and political rights violations and not socio-economic ones (like large-scale corruption).
What are the Policy’s main pillars? They are ‘criminal accountability,’ as mentioned above, as well as, ‘truth-seeking, reparations, memorialisation, conditional amnesty, and institutional reform’.
Is there a sequence to which pillar comes first in the implementation of the Policy?
The Policy doesn’t say, but the paper adds that, while figuring their sequencing is important in order not to have, a ‘selective implementation or eventual abandoning of a sensitive pillar’, it requires, ‘a continuous and ongoing examination of the sociopolitical landscape that emerges and re-emerges during implementation.’
The public’s participation in the Policy itself was challenging, because of the many conflicts in the country when consultations took place (including in Amhara, Oromia, and at the time Tigray region). The ongoing conflicts are expected to affect its implementation significantly as well, according to the brief. But, the author says, this process can be seen ‘as a demonstration of commitment to peace’ while ‘negotiating cessations of hostilities.’
So, what did the participation process look like in the making of the Policy?
The brief outlines ‘three major consultations and surveys’. A survey by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative was conducted across all regions and two administrative cities. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights held 15 consultations. Finally, a Transitional Justice Working Group of Experts, established by the Ministry of Justice, ran ‘public consultations and input collection’.
The paper says, that ‘the youth, specifically university students, have historically led protests, revolutions, and armed conflicts, including the nonviolent movements that brought the current government to power.’ However, there were no youth-only consultations in the making of the Policy.
How can we fix this going forward? Create youth advisory councils that are active in the implementation process, according to the brief.
Who else was not included in the process? The over 3 million Ethiopian diaspora.
What about victims? The policy includes the victim’s participation in the criminal accountability process. But there needs to be mechanisms that make this accessible to the victims. In particular, the report says that this implementation, ‘should be guided by the understanding that victims cannot wait and that the need for (mental health and psychosocial support) is always urgent.’
Does the transitional justice policy allow for international experts? Yes, ‘as advisors and capacity builders’.
Where would international expertise be necessary in its implementation? One example is in the prosecution of international crimes (torture, war crimes, enforced disappearance), as there is no ‘comprehensive legal framework’ for this in Ethiopia’s domestic laws.
Where do CSOs fit in all of this?
The involvement of CSOs must not only go ‘beyond a box-ticking exercise’ says the brief, but adds that the ‘success of transitional justice depends on the active and organized engagement of CSOs.’ This is because, CSOs, can align this policy and its implementation, with ‘public opinion and ground-level realities’ (and in turn help it ‘gain public trust and support.’)
How many new institutions will be part of this process? Four; an office (the Special Prosecution Office) a chamber (the Special Chambers within the Courts of Ethiopia), and two commissions (one Commission for Truth Seeking, and Amnesty and Reparations, and another the Institutional Reform Commission.) Additionally, the Policy ‘implies’ the need for one more institution to coordinate all this.
The Special Prosecution Office will be the most influential organ in criminal liability (deciding who should or should not be prosecuted).
The Special Chambers is the judicial institution created within the existing court systems. This is contrary to the recommendation by the Working Group of Experts, which had pushed for a separate and autonomous institution. The paper says that this is ‘the most significant deviation from public opinion’.
The Commission for Truth Seeking, and Amnesty and Reparations bring us to the question of how far back this Transitional Justice Policy will go in its truth-seeking mechanism (as opposed to criminal accountability). The answer: ‘As far back as evidence of wrongdoing exists.’
The Commission’s responsibility, which includes, ‘reparations, amnesty, truth-seeking, and memorialisation’ has an unlimited scope, and may result in ‘unjustified cherry-picking of events’ says the brief.
Does the Policy consider traditional mechanisms? In one of the public surveys cited in the brief, ‘80% of Ethiopians believe traditional mechanisms should be utilized to address violence’ and the Policy acknowledges this importance. Ethiopia has no shortage of traditional mechanisms, but they come with a catch; these traditional mechanisms, remain primarily patriarchal, among a plethora of other shortcomings. A ‘balanced approach’ is paramount.
Finally, the paper argues that it is important to decentralize, and craft an implementation plan for the regions in Ethiopia. If not, this may lead to selective justice – ‘a recipe for the country’s vicious cycle of violence.’
The full policy brief, entitled, From Policy to Practice, Implementing Transitional Justice in Ethiopia with International Standards, here.
Weather: landslides in Southern Ethiopia (II)
Last week I wrote an update on the landslides in Southern Ethiopia region which were caused by heavy rains. At the time, it was reported that more than 50 people had died. Since then, reports say that over 250 people have lost their lives in the two mudslides that happened one after the other over two consecutive days. The UN says this number could reach 500.
Here’s an excerpt on the search operations, which have continued over the past weekend, a week after the incident:
The mountainous region has made it nearly impossible for heavy machinery to reach the area. So dozens of people have been digging away throughout the day since Monday, excavating by hand, searching for the missing with the help of spades and pickaxes.
A mass funeral was held last week Thursday and there are now plans to evacuate thousands more from these vulnerable areas.
But the landslides have not been limited to Gofa; over the past week, another mudslide in Kafa Zone, in the South West Ethiopia region, ‘has resulted in three fatalities and displaced 24 residents’.
To support those affected by the mudslides, Ethiotelecom, in collaboration with the zonal agency, has created a shortcode to send support: 8091.
The full story on Al Jazeera, here.
Finance: floating, and falling, exchange rates
The Ethiopian government has liberalized the foreign exchange market; ‘for the first time in over half a century, the exchange rate of the Birr will be determined by market forces,’ according to a story by Addis Fortune.
Here’s an excerpt from the story on the difference between the official exchange rate and one set by the parallel market:
The disparity has fueled a robust parallel market, complicating economic planning and fuelling inflation. The government hopes that by allowing market forces to set the exchange rate, these distortions will diminish, creating a more favorable balance of payments and attracting foreign direct investment.
A new directive by the National Bank of Ethiopia has since followed, which allows for ‘banks and authorised foreign exchange dealers the autonomy to set their own rates.’
This liberalization of the foreign exchange market is seen as, ‘a prelude to a multilateral funding deal’, according to the Financial Times.
The deal in question: ‘$10bn in funding from the IMF and World Bank and to restructure debt after defaulting in December.’
Hours later, the IMF ‘approved a new four-year loan program…worth around $3.4 billion.”
The Birr has, over a day, devalued by about 30%, falling from 57 Birr to the dollar, to 75 Birr to the dollar. The story adds that while this might cause price of imported good to increase, an inflation surge may not happen because, ‘Ethiopia had been effectively operating for years at the parallel exchange rate of 110-120 birr to the US dollar.’
A look at the prices of goods sold at the largest open market in Addis Abeba, in Merkato, shows that some imported items like cooking oil and powder milk have increased while others remain at similar prices, according to a story by Ethiopia Insider.
The full story on the market liberalization and the latest directive by the National Bank of Ethiopia, on Addis Fortune, here, and here. The story on the price of goods in Merkato, on Ethiopia Insider, in Amharic here.
Security: we don’t know her (XXV)
Four elders in Ethiopia’s Amhara region have been killed by Fano, the armed group fighting the federal government, according to a story on Addis Standard.
The elders were executed on allegations that they were part of a regional peace council that was aimed at facilitating peace talks between the two parties.
Here's an excerpt from the story on a statement released by the Amhara regional government:
…13 other local elders who were captured together with the deceased still remain in the hands of the Fano armed groups sustaining “inhumane punishment and torture,” the statement added.
The full story, which talks about the details of the statement and a widely circulating video of the incident, on Addis Standard, here. To look at the previous 24 updates on the security situation in Ethiopia’s Amhara region, go here.
Labor rights: strikes in Central Ethiopia
Health workers, in the Central Ethiopia region, have been on a strike because of delayed salaries. This is the third strike this year, and the hospital’s 300 staff, are demanding two months’ unpaid salaries, according to a story by Addis Standard.
Here’s an excerpt:
Local officials attributed the problem to a widespread budget deficit that has affected several newly established regions splitting from the now defunct Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples region (SNNPR).
The story, which features the challenges faced by the staff, and a conversation with the head of the hospital, on Addis Standard, here.
That’s all for this week. I’ll be back next week with more updates!
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Thank you, Maya.