reform to make way for executive power
why does 2019 seem like a thousand years ago?
Hi there,
A big heartfelt thank you to everyone who responded to the call from last week’s edition. It’s been so affirming (we really are in community over here)! Lella’s fundraiser is nearly at its goal, so if you’ve missed last week’s edition, please take a moment and contribute if you can.
It’s officially rainy season in Addis now. I’m layering to within an inch of my life, though it seems no amount of clothes will likely save my feet, which are sadly destined to freeze. Luckily, I’m headed to another city on Tuesday where the weather is much more favorable. I‘m planning to center next week’s edition on the region it’s in. Stay tuned.
A quick correction before we dive in.
In the June 24 edition entitled “immunity for torturers, possibly,” I wrote about a new law that included a controversial provision granting undercover agents immunity for crimes, including torture, if committed in the course of investigating financial crimes.
In that edition, I mistakenly referred to the law as the Asset Recovery Law. The correct name is the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation.
That update also included other provisions correctly attributed to the Asset Recovery Law, which is a separate law passed earlier in January.
For clarity, here is a story on Addis Standard on the asset recovery law. Here is a piece on The Reporter on the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation
Apologies for the mix-up. You can find the edited version of the edition with footnotes, here.
Big shout out to Hamid, who helped in reviewing this week’s edition for factual errors before it went out.
With that cleared up, let’s go to the news.
Elections: debating on a new law
In January, I wrote about an update on new changes coming to the electoral law; formally known as the Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Election's Code of Conduct Proclamation.
This law came into effect in 2019, a year after the change in government in Ethiopia. That year saw the enactment of numerous new laws, including a progressive media law and a law governing civil society (one that created an ‘enabling environment’ after a decade under a repressive law). If you’ve been following this newsletter, you’ll know that the media law was repealed earlier in April. The civil society law is expected to follow suit shortly (more on that below).
Parliamentarians had a discussion forum on this draft election law, according to a story on The Reporter. They seem to think that this law is out of touch with the current realities in Ethiopia.
Here’s an excerpt:
One major concern raised was the requirement for a national party to secure 60 percent of support signatures from six regions in addition to its main region of operation.
Parties argued that such a requirement is unrealistic in the current environment, where free movement across regions is often restricted due to conflicts in many parts of the country.
The draft law grants decision-making powers to polling station administrators. It also requires at least 30 percent of members in a political party to make financial contributions to be eligible for government support.
Political parties are asking for an additional clause: the protection of opposition political parties against harassment and arrest.
The full story on The Reporter, here, and the Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Election's Code of Conduct Proclamation, here.
Civic society: how will this impact elections?
I’m adding a bit more here to the update I wrote at the end of last month on the amendment to the civil society law. The current law is formally known as the Organisations of Civil Societies Proclamation and came into effect in 2019 (repealing an older Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009).
What were the circumstances when this new law for civil society came into effect?
In 2019, Ethiopia was in a very different place. A Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council had been set up to advise on the reform charted for the country. Several laws were revised, including the old civil society law, which the Advisory Council deemed “unjustly restrictive”.
But this law is now under revision. Some of the major changes include restricting civil society actors from receiving any international support (financial or technical) for work related to elections.
Should civil society organisations come to any agreements with international organisations, the draft proposes that they have to notify the regulatory body within 14 days.
The draft law also leaves open to interpretation the grounds for when the regulatory body can take administrative measures against civil society organisations. It lists 8 specific cases and adds ‘similar acts’ at the end.
Other changes include formally granting the regulatory body the mandate to freeze bank accounts (shifting this power from a de facto practice to a de jure authority).
The amendments are broader than mentioned here, and according to civic society actors I spoke with, are indicative of how the current government sees the role of the CSOs in the country’s development.
How are these legal changes being justified just a few years after they came into effect (especially considering the time and resources spent on drafting them)?
To, ‘reduce challenges encountered during implementation in recent years’, says an official from the Ministry of Justice (similar to the arguments presented for the change in the media law).
What do civil society actors think is the (real) reason? Here’s an excerpt from a story on Addis Standard:
Recalling the post-2018 reform era, Befekadu noted that several repressive laws had been revised under a “a new and popular government”. He recalled that there was an “alignment of interests” between the “people’s power”, the media and civil society organizations and the “reformist government” that was then consolidating power.
But as those institutions began to demand accountability, a shift occurred. “The government in power “began to feel uncomfortable.”. That created a misalignment of interests between the media, civil society and the government, which “began to view them as enemies,” Befekadu explained.
If you want an explainer on what the legal reform looked like in 2019, who led the process, and what laws were changed, take a look at this article by Ethiopia Insight; Reforming Ethiopia’s draconian laws amid a derailing transition.
Take a look at the current Organisations of Civil Societies Proclamation here.
Tigray: an update on the region
In April, I wrote an update on Tigray, on the new president of the region’s interim administration.
The interim administration was established in March 2023, after the end of the Tigray war (which lasted from November 2020 to November 2022).
Since its establishment, it has faced criticism on many fronts: failing to provide solutions to the internally displaced people in the region, not being inclusive of other political parties in the region, and internal division within the main party in the administration, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). You can read more about this internal division here.
When a new president was appointed in April, it was hoped to be ‘a step that averted the risk of renewed conflict in the region’, according to an analysis piece on Addis Standard. But this hasn’t really worked.
Here’s an excerpt from the story:
One evidence for this is the recent exchange of fire in the Wajerat district of the region’s southeastern zone. This clash occurred between Tigrayan security forces and armed groups calling themselves “Tigray Peace Forces,” who had been training in the Afar region.
The TPLF also still influences the lower administrative structures of the region, challenging the authority of the interim administration.
By May, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia revoked the legal status of the TPLF, creating another source of tension with the federal government.
What else? Here’ another excerpt:
There is also widespread fear that the ongoing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea could once again turn the region into a battleground.
Earlier this month, the Prime Minister called on religious bodies to intervene immediately if they wish to avoid seeing another war unfold in Tigray. An opposition political party in the region says this as a threat from the federal government (“a shocking admission of intent to inflict further suffering”).
The analysis piece, which looks in-depth at the dispute over the territories in Western Tigray, as well as the status of internally displaced people in the region, here.
Infrastructure: what was Addis before its makeover?
Addis Abeba has changed rapidly over the past year, largely due to the Corridor Development Project. Some areas in the city are now completely unrecognizable.
There have been articles written on this change: on the demolition of historic areas like Piassa, on the ‘highly uneven impacts and enormous costs’ of these transformations, including a call to end forced evictions related to the project. (I also wrote a short piece on Piassa for The Continent).
Yet the documentation is not commensurate with the changes that have taken place. A significant reason is the restricted flow of information. Everyone seems to be operating on a need-to-know basis (and we don’t need to know).
A new project named Addis Memories (‘Ethiopia's first digital memory wall’) is archiving photos of these rapidly changing neighborhoods. The website is up for anyone who wants to share photos and become ‘part of the first virtual museum of Addis Ababa’.
You can check it out here.
Women’s rights: life in prison
The details of Zewdu Haftu’s murder are hard to read. I have written about Zewdu before. The first time was in August 2024, in a story that covered the rise of violence against women and girls in Ethiopia for The New Humanitarian.
The second time was earlier in May, when two men were found guilty of her murder in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. The defendants disrupted the court proceedings and hurled threats at the presiding judge. This was the final straw for judges in the region’s capital, Mekelle. Days later, the Tigray Judges Association announced that they would not return to work until they were guaranteed better protection.
Since then, the judges have returned to work with some measures in place (including the presence of armed security personnel in courts).
Last week, the two men found guilty of Zewdu’s murder were sentenced to life imprisonment.
Here’s an excerpt from a post on Wegahta Facts:
For nearly two years, Zewdu’s case was plagued by delays, procedural disruptions, and what many saw as deliberate efforts to derail the investigation.
It was alleged that the suspects were being shielded due to their political and security ties with senior officials in the government and security apparatus.
The full post on Wegahta Facts, here.
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