Addis Abeba’s ‘facelift’
and why no one will go on the record
Hi there,
Welcome to the 100th edition of this newsletter. Big thank you to everyone who has taken time over the past two years to email me and express gratitude and share encouraging words - it’s gotten me and Sifter this far.
I was at a discussion the past week on the media’s role in some of the country’s biggest undertakings – the national dialogue, the transitional justice policy (and the upcoming election?).
The central message of that discussion? That continuous engagement is important despite the challenges and critical reporting with the understanding that this is not a lose-lose.
I also met with journalists working in other regions of Ethiopia, and this served as a reminder of the visibility that comes with working as a journalist based in the capital, and the responsibility of looking out for our colleagues in other parts of the country.
To new subscribers, welcome!
My name is Maya Misikir, and I’m a freelance reporter based in Addis Abeba. I write Sifter, this newsletter where I send out the week’s top 5 stories on human rights and news in Ethiopia.
Now, to the news.
Infrastructure: an explanation for what’s happening
These days most of the conversations I have are dominated by the construction – and demolition – that seems to be everywhere in the city (the Corridor Development Project). Kazanchis is now unrecognizable, like Piassa. And everything is so torn down that it’s hard to tell where you are in the middle of all the dust and excavators.
In the past editions of this newsletter, I have written about the city’s Corridor Development Project – when the order to ‘move’ Piassa’s residents came. Reports from the local outlet, Ethiopia Insider, talked about the first few meetings with residents and city administrators, where they voiced their protests on relocation and the speed at which things were happening.
Concerns about preserving the heritage of these old parts of the city were also part of these conversations.
Piassa, and other parts of the city, have changed - some parts beyond recognition for anyone who hasn’t been in Addis for the past few months. The same process is happening to Kazanchis, another old part of the city.
What better time than now to ‘learn about Ethiopia’s political dynamics through its latest urban megaprojects’?
Here are excerpts from a paper I read, entitled, Urban layers of political rupture: the ‘new’ politics of Addis Ababa’s megaprojects. The paper is from 2020 and looks at two specific mega projects (‘LaGare’ and ‘Beautifying Sheger’) to explain the ‘shifting ideologies and new priorities’ that come with these urban projects.
While the paper was published before the official launch of the Corridor Development Project, it can help guide our understanding of ‘the new administration through its urban endeavours’.
The author argues that ‘there is a new urban aesthetic emerging in Addis Ababa targeting domestic elites, the Ethiopian diaspora and tourists.’
What are Lagare and Beautifying Sheger? (The predecessors of the Corridor Development Project.)
LaGare is a ‘36-hectare luxury real estate complex’ in the center of Addis Abeba that is backed by Abu-Dhabi-based Eagle Hills. Beautifying Sheger is the ‘56 km river-bank restoration project’.
Have past leaders of Ethiopia changed the city through mega-projects? The author gives many examples.
Emperor Menelik (1889–1913) ‘built the national palace, the first gravel road, the marketplace, and the national railway’.
Emperor Haile Selassie (1930 - 1974) ‘increased the number of monuments commemorating the Battle of Adwa and Yekatit 12, as well as the construction of the Lion of Judah statue and the Holy Trinity Cathedral Church. (It was during this time that Ethiopia was under ‘fascist Italian occupation’).
The communist Derg regime (1974 - 1991) 'restored Meskel Square for its military parades’ and through its ‘Land to the Tiller’ proclamation took hold of many private and imperial properties’.
The EPRDF (1991-2018) built ‘Sub-Sahara Africa’s first Light-Rail Transit (LRT) system and an expansive condominium social housing scheme’.
What about Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration?
There is a shift, from the pro-poor policies of the EPRDF to an ‘urban form that focuses on luxury real estate projects and a vibrant urban tourism sector targeting domestic elites, the Ethiopian diaspora and international tourists’.
The change of leadership, in 2018 itself, came around because of the Addis Abeba Masterplan, an urban development strategy, the author explains. It included expansion plans for the city, and ‘prompted the first wave of popular protests’ in 2014 that led to Abiy Ahmed emerging as the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia four years down the road.
Here’s an excerpt:
The Masterplan was the final straw of long-standing structural challenges faced by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front(EPRDF), the ruling coalition in power since deposing the Derg in 1991.
What do these styles of implementing projects between the former EPRDF regime and the current one have in common?
The author says that, a ‘lack of coordination with the relevant bureaucracies and the highly centralized decision-making process.’ Both regimes followed a top-down approach to implementing their ‘overly ambitious plans’.
How top-down are we talking?
In the LaGare project, the author mentions that ‘city administration officials working at the Addis Ababa Planning Commission, the Construction Bureau and even the Transport Programs Management Office were unaware that these plans were in the works until they were officially announced.’
This is not new. It is the modus operandi of previous Ethiopian regimes, argues the author, and that, ‘top-down, state-led planning in Ethiopia dates back to the mid nineteenth century.’
The top-down approach means these projects, ‘ignore essential features of any real, functioning social order.’ (Remember the residents of Piassa who were asking that they be relocated to a new site together with their neighbors?)
How about financing for projects under these two regimes?
During the EPRDF, when the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was being built, the ‘wider public’ was given an ‘opportunity to buy government bonds to contribute to the dam’s development’. (I was in university then, and in reality, we had no say when they cut our monthly stipend to go toward that).
For the two megaprojects under the new administration? A call was made by the Prime Minister to ‘Ethiopia’s narrow economic elite to fund this urban megaproject through his ‘Dine for Sheger’ campaign’ (here too, arms were twisted).
But this facelift of Addis Abeba has come under heavy criticism from many, and the author adds that with ‘major sanitation, housing and transportation shortages,’ these mega projects ‘are more likely than not to reinforce existing spatial injustices, hierarchies of power and sentiments of exclusion.’
Here's an excerpt:
While the intention of these megaprojects is to ‘reposition the city on the competitive landscape with global investors in mind, they often ignore their immediate surroundings.
Is this all bad? Here’s a final excerpt that echoes the sentiment from the conversations I have these days:
There is no denying that there is an urgent need for recreational parks, green spaces and public outlets in Addis Ababa for local residents and for international tourists….This administration has to be more keenly aware of the unintended social, political and economic consequences of its urban megaprojects and where possible ‘take a small step, stand back, observe and then plan the next small move.’
The link to the full paper, which I highly recommend for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of what is happening to the city, here.
Human rights: reprisal for speaking out
In July, I wrote an update on an investigative piece on illicit mining in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. After the two years of war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) ended in November 2022, in the post-conflict region, mining hotspots ‘were taken over by the military commanders and armed groups, local youth, and foreigners who work with them.’
Now, a survey conducted by the region’s three opposition political groups shows that those who have reported on these illegal mining activities have faced, ‘reprisal, intimidation, and even killings’ according to a story on The Reporter.
Who is responsible for these reprisals?
Here’s an excerpt from a story:
…a party-led investigation in Asgede Woreda revealed that local security forces, the Woreda administrative office, the security chief, the district administration’s security officers, and the TPLF party administration office in the Woreda, are responsible for the alleged killings and repression of TIP members.
Local activists and members of the opposition political groups have been the ones targeted.
The full story, on The Reporter, here.
Civic space: rule by law
At the end of last month, the civil society regulatory body (ACSO) suspended the license of three civil society organizations: the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia, and Lawyers for Human Rights. Then last week I wrote an update on the story when the suspensions were lifted.
But within days, two of the three organizations have been suspended again (CARD and Lawyers for Human Rights).
The Ethiopian Human Rights Defenders Center says that it is ‘deeply concerned’ and that this recent decision will ‘restrict civil society organizations, further limit civic space and undermine the vital work of human rights defenders.’.
The new suspensions have been placed on CARD because the regulatory body says it has not’ course corrected’ as per the warning it was given.
Three additional transgressions were cited by the regulatory body this time: acting irresponsibly and against the ideals of unity, opening bank accounts without notifying the regulatory body, and not working on projects in collaboration with the government.
Go here to find out why they were suspended in the first place.
The full story, in Amharic, on the suspension of CARD, on Ethiopia Insider, here.
Security: we don’t know her (XXXV)
The updates from the conflict in Ethiopia’s Amhara region continue for the 35th part – see all previous editions in chronological order, here.
Food aid delivery, disrupted by the volatile security in the region, caused by fighting between the federal troops and the region’s informal militia (the Fano), resumed last week in the North Wollo zone.
The delivery of food aid, necessitated by the conflict itself (which started last year in August) and prolonged drought, had been paused for two months.
Here’s an excerpt from a story on Addis Standard:
…community elders, religious leaders, and agricultural and health professionals from Bugna district held discussions with government officials and security representatives…and the community representatives assured officials that they would take responsibility for ensuring the safe delivery of the aid if it was sent to the area.
Meanwhile, at a ‘government-organized’ rally in the region’s capital city, Bahir Dar, as well as other areas like Debre Berhan, bomb attacks ‘left one person dead and several others injured’. The region’s government, on the other hand, has declared the ‘demonstrations as peaceful’.
The full story on Addis Standard, here.
Labor rights: salaries unpaid, promises delayed
Salaries for civil servants were promised to be increased by October (despite the civil servant’s union saying the promised increments wouldn’t match the cost of living).
These promises were made to buffer the impact of the ‘macroeconomic reforms from last July’, including the change in the government’s foreign exchange market (and the consequent plummet in the value of the Ethiopian Birr). An official increase in transportation fares was also made shortly after.
Despite collecting data on ‘civil servants’ current salaries and job positions,’ the increases have yet to happen for civil servants in regional states, according to a story by Addis Standard.
Close to 50 percent (47.94) of civil servants in Ethiopia, of which there are 2.4 million, earn salaries deemed ‘below the extreme poverty line’.
In Ethiopia’s South West region, government employees have not been paid for three consecutive months, and ‘have taken up daily labor or are selling firewood to sustain their families’.
Here’s an excerpt of what one civil servant is quoted as saying in the story:
The officer added that the situation has deeply impacted the local economy, which heavily depends on the salaries of government employees. “Now, there’s no one to help,” he explained, highlighting his inability to afford rent or basic necessities, which has also left landlords in financial distress.
Names of people cited in the story have been changed for security reasons (‘local authorities threatening employees with disciplinary action whenever they raise concerns about unpaid salaries’).
In November, I wrote an update on how teachers in Ethiopia’s Tigray region were preparing to take the region’s administration to court for 17 months of unpaid salaries.
The full story on Addis Standard, on the delayed salary increases, here, and on the unpaid salaries, here.
That’s all for this week. I’ll be back next week with more updates!
In the meantime, feel free to share this with anyone you think can benefit from keeping up with what’s going on in Ethiopia.
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I think the corridor project should be discussed more throughout the city