a serious fracture in leadership
and likely scenarios for Ethiopia's dialogue process
Hi there,
The past week has been marked by exceptionally bad internet connection in Addis Abeba, which has made writing this newsletter a much longer and frustrating process than necessary. But there’s also some good news – Sifter reached 1000 subscribers last week. Thanks to everyone who has shared this with their networks.
To new subscribers, welcome!
My name is Maya Misikir, and I’m a freelance reporter based in Addis Abeba. I write Sifter, this newsletter where I send out the week’s top 5 stories on human rights and news in Ethiopia.
Now, to the news.
Politics: will the party survive this?
We are two months away from the second anniversary of the Cessation of Hostilities - the peace deal that ended the Tigray war, signed between the federal government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The Pretoria Agreement, as it is also known, was brokered by the African Union, in South Africa.
Ethiopia’s Tigray region, nearly two years later, is facing another crisis that experts say threatens the fragile peace and security achieved since then.
What are the causes of these concerns? One is the ‘contested’ borders; areas of Tigray region that are occupied by Amhara and Eritrean forces.
What are Amhara militia and Eritrean forces doing in Tigray? During the war, Amhara regional forces and informal militia as well as Eritrean troops fought alongside the federal government, took over and remained in the territory of Tigray.
One of the main outcomes of the peace agreement is DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of former fighters in Tigray region (over 200,000). In July, TPLF’s president stated that to disarm and demobilize the former TPLF fighters, Amhara militia and Eritrean forces occupying Tigrayan territory must first leave.
What else is a cause of concern in Tigray? The return of internally displaced people to these ‘contested’ areas. During the war, tens of thousands of people, mostly Tigrayans were displaced fleeing war, including through what human rights organizations documented as ethnic cleansing campaigns.
And more recently? Internal division within the TPLF itself.
What is the internal division about? A rift has been developing within the political party, between what one report called “the old and the new guard.”
This rift is primarily represented between the party’s chair, Debretsion Gebremichael, and his former deputy, Getachew Reda, both senior party members. Getachew Reda also serves as the current president of the region’s interim administration; the administration set up to lead the region after the peace deal was brokered (until an election takes place.)
What is the rift itself about? The first issue is the legal status of the TPLF. Once branded a terrorist organization during the Tigray war, the label was lifted after the peace deal was signed but the legal status of the political party was cancelled during the war.
The TPLF wanted to be reinstated once again as a political party with the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia. However, the Board decided that there was no legal ground to allow the TPLF to be reinstated to its previous status. However, it could be registered as a brand new party (the TPLF’s history goes as far back as 1975).
During this back and forth, the TPLF went ahead and convened its 14th Congress on August 13, in Tigray, where it re-elected its current chair.
Who was missing at the 14th Congress of the TPLF? Senior members of the TPLF including 17 central committee members and the party’s former vice-chair and current president of the region interim administration (Getachew Reda). After boycotting this meeting, the region’s president, joined by other, ‘leadership from regional, zonal, and district levels within the region’, declared the results of the TPLF’s Congress, as “null and void”.
Over the past month, despite concerns about the occupation of territories by Amhara and Eritrean troops, Tigray’s interim administration made moves toward the ‘demobilization and reintegration of former Tigray combatants’.
What else happened over the past few months in the region? In June of this year, the region’s Supreme Court president and vice-president, both stepped down stating that they are unable to work under the current conditions in the region.
What is happening now? The region’s interim administration says it is undergoing, a ‘reshuffle’ as ‘part of broader administrative reforms’ and is appointing new zonal administrators according to a story by Addis Standard. This move is rejected by the TPLF. The US’s special envoy to the Horn of Africa also met with representatives of both sides last week, ‘urging them to resolve the division’.
Nearly a million are still displaced in Tigray by the two-year war that has decimated the region’s basic infrastructure, and the region’s population is facing serious humanitarian challenges, including the effects of drought, and famine.
This update was sourced from multiple reports including this one on Addis Standard, which has a in-depth explanation. I also relied on two reports by the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD). Hit reply and me know if you’re interested to see the reports and I’ll share it with you. Also worth a read, is this piece on The Continent, which is a brief but well-rounded overview on the history of the TPLF and why it is where it is today.
Peace: curious as to how this will end
Back in June, in an update entitled, ‘we need to talk’, I wrote about Ethiopia’s National Dialogue Commission. At the time, the Commission was just concluding its agenda gathering and consultation in Addis Abeba. An agenda gathering and consultation is a process where the Commission collects ideas from different representatives on what they think is important to discuss in the upcoming national dialogue.
In that post, I talked about what the Commission is set up to do (facilitate dialogue across different actors in the country), who makes up this Commission, and what obstacles it faces in its work (ongoing conflicts and withdrawal of political parties from said dialogue process).
So, where are today, three months later? The Commission in an update shared on its Telegram page last week, said that it has concluded ‘collecting agendas’ across two administrative cities in the country, namely Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa city administrations, as well as five regions in Ethiopia: Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Sidama and Central Ethiopia Region.
Ethiopia has 12 regions and 2 administrative cities, which means there are still seven regions left to go. The Commission says that it plans to finish collecting agendas in five regions by November, and will wait to conduct this in Tigray and Amhara regions until the conditions are right there.
The end result of collecting these agendas is to have a final national-level dialogue around the selected topics, with representative across the country.
What then? Take a look at these four possible scenarios as to how this might play out, as explained by an author in paper published earlier in July.
The first one is a successful national dialogue; Ethiopians reach a consensus on the country’s challenges where ‘key stakeholders’ choose ‘to set aside their arms’ and work on ‘rebuilding the nation’. Power is decentralized, and this might lead to constitutional reform. This scenario will position Ethiopia “as a beacon of peace and stability”. However, even in this best case scenario, the author says that it may not lead to the complete resolution of the crisis, rather a confirmation that the wheels have been set in motion.
The second is a collapse of the national dialogue; no consensus is reached in this scenario, despite a potentially successful start. This may end up in a crisis and ‘even evolve into conflict, potentially necessitating international intervention’. On the other hand, despite its collapse, this may not be the worst-case scenario, says the author. In the case that it won’t lead to a ‘disastrous conflict’ it could be an opportunity to learn from mistakes and do better at the next national dialogue process.
The third scenario is a delegitimized national dialogue; here the process fails to address concerns of stakeholders and is not seen as a way to resolve difference. This is likely to happen if the set-up of the Commission has raised questions from the get-go (which it has), if it shows inconsistency in it procedures, and if it is not inclusive. The results of a delegitimized national dialogue? Violence and unrest with ‘ramifications for the broader Horn of Africa region.’
The fourth scenario is the consolidation of the current Ethiopian leadership; here the process is used as a way to consolidate the powers of the current government, potentially leading to constitutional reforms that will get rid of ‘checks and balances’ in the country’s governance. This could result in an ‘authoritarian leadership that centralizes power at the highest level.’
The issue discussed throughout the four scenarios are much more detailed and nuanced than this, and the paper, entitled “Ethiopia’s National Dialogue: Issues and Potential Scenarios” also does a great job explaining the historical background of Ethiopia, it’s federal system, and much more.
Infrastructure: developments on the port deal
Negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia, mediated by Turkey, were expected to go into their third round this week. That has now been postponed due to ‘conflicting schedules’, says Addis Standard.
The start of this current geopolitical mess is the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1, 2024, which Somaliland’s Foreign Minister now says, “is finalized, and a formal legal agreement is imminent”.
Meanwhile, Egypt’s expression of support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, through a defense pact, could impact the ‘power balance’ between Ethiopia and Somalia, according to a story by Middle East Eye.
Here’s an excerpt from the story:
An Egyptian military presence would reduce Ethiopia’s ability to meddle in Somali affairs, while Egypt’s military training and support for the Somali army could enhance Somalia’s ability to secure its borders and strengthen its sovereignty.
The Somaliland government, on its part, has ‘closed the Egyptian Cultural Library in Hargeisa’.
As for Somalia? Here’s what the country’s minister of foreign affairs said in a story by VOA:
Somalia will consider establishing contacts with and support rebels fighting in Ethiopia if the Ethiopian government attempts to implement the deal it signed with Somaliland.
The full story, which breaks down the complex relationship between the countries, on Middle East Eye, here, on VOA, here, and on Addis Standard, here.
For earlier updates on this agreement, go here.
Security: more incidents in South Ethiopia
At the end of last month, I wrote an update on how an armed group had attacked a town in the South Ethiopia region. The attackers went after the town’s administrative and security offices and killed eleven people which included several police officers.
Over the past week, security disruptions in the same region have continued, with four farmers abducted and then killed by armed groups coming from the neighboring Oromia region, according to a story by Addis Standard. This happened, despite their families making the ransom payment requested of them.
Here’s an excerpt from the story:
…the farmers were abducted on Thursday morning while herding cattle. The captors reportedly demanded a ransom of 100,000 Birr and one carton of cigarettes for their release.
The full story, which cites a response from administrators in area, here.
Business: nice things are not nice at all
Frankincense is leading in popularity, ahead of ‘lavender, tea tree and other botanicals’ in the wellness industry, and this in turn has threatened the’ future of the species – and of local farmers’ says a story by The Guardian.
Why this new focus on Frankincense? Here’s an excerpt from the story:
Recently, however, this ancient resin has become a hot commodity globally as its alleged health benefits catch the attention of the wellness industry, a sector worth about $5.6tn a year.
Ethiopia is one of six countries where the, ‘largest concentrations of frankincense trees are found’. But as demand for it has increased, the supply chain process remain murky, and exploitative, says the story.
The story juxtapositions, one end, a ‘luxury French brand’ which sells ‘perfumes infused with frankincense for hundreds of pounds a bottle’. On the other end, in Ethiopia’s war-torn Tigray region, where farmers make a living selling it for as low as 2 US dollars a kilo, the surge in demand has caused overexploitation.
The story — which shows the ‘massive disconnect’ between consumers and what happens on the ground, and is a sobering reminder of why it’s important to know what we buy and from whom we buy it— on The Guardian, here.
That’s all for this week. I’ll be back next week with more updates!
In the meantime, feel free to share this with anyone you think can benefit from keeping up with what’s going on in Ethiopia.
Was this forwarded to you by someone? Then hit the button below to subscribe and get free weekly updates.
Thank you, Maya. That was an interesting read.
these reports are better than any news outlets. thank you sister! 😇